Weil v. Barthel [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
12-23-1955
Weil v. Barthel [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Other Law Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Weil v. Barthel [DISSENT]" (1955). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 188.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/188
Dec. WEIL v. BARTHEL 
[45 C.2d 835; 291 P.2d 30] 
[Sac. No. 6398. In Bank. Dec. 
835 
ROBERT G. WElL, Appellant, v. HARVEY 0. BARTHEL 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Pleading- Demurrer- As Admission.-A demurrer reaches 
only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may 
be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice. 
[2] Judgments-Res Judicata-Pleading.-When a former judg-
ment is properly pleaded in a complaint, it may be considered 
by the trial court in determining whether it is res judicata 
of plaintiff's cause of action. 
(3] Id.-Res Judicata.-A final judgment is res judicata of the 
issues involved therein where the court had jurisdiction. 
[4] Id.-Res Judicata-Matters Concluded.-A judgment in a 
prior action terminating all interest of the purchasers under 
an executory land sales contract, enjoining them from assert-
ing any right in such contract or title to such land, declaring 
that the vendors were the owners of the property in fee simple 
subject to its sale by order of court, and foreclosing all equity 
of redemption is res judicata in a subsequent action by the 
assignee of such purchasers to compel redemption and to quiet 
title to such realty which had been sold by judicial sale. 
[5] Id.- Res Judicata- Validity of Judgment.-An erroneous 
judgment is as conclusive as a correct one. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yolo 
County. C. C. McDonald, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to compel redemption and to quiet title to real prop-
erty. Judgment for defendants, entered on an order sus-
taining a general demurrer to the complaint without leave to 
amend, affirmed. 
James S. Eddy and Douglas C. Busath for Appellant. 
Robert M. Cole for Respondents. 
Driver & Driver as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent<J. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 62; Am.Jur., Pleading, §§ 207, 
238 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 165; Am.Jur., Judgments, §§ 161, 
162. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pleading, § 84(4); [2] Judgments, 
§441; [3] Judgments, §338;) [4) Judgments, §412(4); [5] Judg-
ments,§ 347. 
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12 Cal.2d 633, 
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facts of the instant 
defendants in bar of the 
was pleaded and 
the trial court properly 
upon the 
demurrer. Since the was it is unnecessary 
to consider whether the doctrine of judicial notice is here 
applicable. \Ve do not decide snch 
[3] As to the second it is the general rule that 
a final is issues involved therein 
where the trial court had jurisdiction. (Pacific JJiutual Life 
Ins. Co. v.llicConnell, 44 Cal.2d 715, 725 [10] [285 P.2d 636]; 
San Diego Trust & Sav. Bank v. Young, 19 Cal.2d 98, 100 [1] 
[119 P.2d 133].) 
[4] In the present case the record discloses that the 
Barthels formerly were owners of a tract of unimproved land. 
In 1948, they entered into an oral contract, which was super-
seded by a later oral agreement, to sell the land and an aban-
doned streetcar on the to the Burtons. If the consid-
eration was not paid in cash, the Barthe1s were to receive a 
note secured by a purchase money trust deed. The Burtons 
WEIL v. BARTHEL [45 C.2d 
took possession of the property and im-
provements but, although demands were made upon them, they 
refused to pay the purchase price or to execute a note. In 
October of that year, a third oral agreement was made, the 
Burtons agreeing to pay immediately $5,000 for the land and 
to perform certain other obligations which were incident to the 
original agreements. 
The Burtons continued in possession of the property for 
more than a year and one-half without paying the agreed 
purchase price. During that time, they continued to make im-
provements on the property for which they incurred me-
chanics' liens and claims of materialmen in the sum of about 
$5,700. Despite repeated demands and a tender of a deed to 
the property by the Barthels, the purchase price remained 
unpaid. The Burtons resided in one of the buildings on the 
property without paying rent, and the Barthels were deprived 
of the crops from several walnut trees during the period of 
occupancy. 
Finally, the Barthels brought suit against the Burtons. 
Their complaint was in two counts. In the first one, they 
alleged the execution of the oral agreements, the defendants' 
breach, their unlawful holding of possession of the premises, 
and losses assertedly resulting therefrom. The second count 
pleaded that the Barthels were the owners of the property in 
question and that the Burtons claimed a right in it adverse to 
them. The prayer was for a cancellation of the oral agreement 
and a decree adjudging the defendants to be without interest 
in the property and enjoining them from asserting any claim 
to it. It was also prayed that the sheriff be commanded to put 
them into possession of the realty and to evict the Burtons. 
They also sought damages. 
The trial court found that the Burtons had breached their 
oral agreement and that ''Plaintiffs are the owners of said 
property, and Defendants, and anyone acting through them, 
have no right, title, or interest therein. The Plaintiffs have 
owned said real property at all times herein mentioned, subject 
only to said oral agreements.'' The Burtons had erected sub-
stantial improvements on the property of an uncertain value, 
and the court found that liens had accrued against the realty 
for mechanics' services and materialmen's claims; that the 
Burtons were in unlawful possession of the premises, and that 
the Barthels had been damaged by loss of use of the property 
and loss of the walnut crops. 
It was adjudged: {1) that the interest of the Burtons, and 
of any person claiming through them, in the real property or 
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the oral contract ''is nd foreelosed'' ; 
(2) that the Bm·tons and such other persons were enjoined 
from aserting ''any right, title or interest in and to said con-
tract or said real property, which arose before the date of this 
Decree": that the Barthels were the o·wners of the real 
property in fee simple subject to its sale order of the court 
''in the manner provided by law for sale to execu-
tion upon real property"; that title was to be in 
the purchaser from all claims by either the Rlrthels or the 
Burtons, or persons acting through them; tlwt they were 
enjoined from asserting any claim or demand arising prior to 
the date of the decrre and ( 6) that "all of redemptioll 
of any of the aforesaid persons is hereby foreclosed." 
No appeal was taken from the decree and it became final. 
Pursuant to the decree, the property was sold at public auction 
to the Barthels and the proceeds from the sale distributed as 
ordered by the court. 
From the foregoing facts it is apparent that the very issue 
which is presented in the instant case was before the trial court 
in the prior action, and that it gave a judgment contrary to the 
present contentions of the plaintiff, which expressly foreclosed 
"all equity of redemption of any of the aforesaid persons," 
which includes the plaintiff. Since it appears that in the 
prior action the trial court had jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter and of the parties thereto, and the judgment in such 
action has become final, it may not now be attacked by plaintiff 
on the ground that it was incorrect. [5] In Panos v. Great 
Western Packing Co. this court, speaking through Mr. Chief 
Justice Gibson, succinctly stated the applicable rule thus: 
''An erroneous judgment is as conclusive as a correct one.'' 
(21 Cal.2d 636, 640 [4] [134 P.2d 242].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-1 dissent. 
'l'he majority opinion states that there is no question here 
of whether a trial court may take judici.al notice of a judgment 
in another action in ruling on a demurrer based on res judicata 
because the judgment ''was pleaded.'' The record does not 
bear out that statement. In the complaint it is alleged that 
there was a judgment rendered on a stated day and the aspects 




former judgment upon liti-
is thereby waived in 
§ 233, p. 214; 50 C.J.S., 
Petroleurn Co., Ltd. v. Long, 
; R1'cleaux v. Torgrimson, 12 
v. Court, 74 
Nor can respondents avail 
notice in support of 
It is the general 
rule that 'the court will not take notice of other ac-
tions, not even those or concluded in the same court.' 
l Citations.] The of a court to take 
of its own records 'is limited to 
case.' " In "Willson v. 
705, 711 P.2d , it was said: "To hold that a court 
may generally take notice of another proceeding with 
a view to determining whether it is a bar to the pending suit, 
would do away with the rule that the defense of res judicata 
may not be raised by demurrer unless the facts appear in the 
complaint, in those cases where the judgment relied on as a 
bar was rendered by the same court.'' The general rule is 
apparently subject to an In Christiana v. Rose, 
100 CaLApp.2d 46, 52-53 [222 P.2d 891], the court said: "It 
has been held in the interests of the court may 
take judicial notice of proceedings in other cases in the same 
court. (Willson v. Nat. Bank, 21 Cal.2d 705, 
711 [134 P.2d 800]; Calhoun v. Calhottn, 81 Cal.App.2d 297, 
302 [183 P.2d 922] ) In the instant case the appellant in his 
Dec. "\VEIL v. BARTHEL 
[45 C.2d 835; 291 P.2d 30] 
complaint referred to the death action and 
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cally alleged the date of the case, its file number in the clerk's 
office, and the date the appellate court affirmed. Under such 
circumstances, there can be no doubt but that this court may 
look at and consider the records in the wrongful death action. 
(See Popcorn Equipment Co. v. Page, 92 Cal.App.2d 448, 453 
[207 P.2d 647] .) " (Emphasis added.) The Calhoun case 
involved taking judicial notice of a former in the same 
court between the same parties; the Christiana case involved 
another case which had been appealed; the Popcorn Equip-
ment Company case pointed out that ''Only in exceptional 
cases will the court depart from the general rule, for example 
in order to avoid a resulting unreasonable hardship. Under 
certain circumstances the Supreme Cour~ will take judicial 
notice of the records of that court, although not pleaded in the 
trial court, when brought to the court's attention in some ap-
propriate manner." (Popcorn Equipment Co. v. Page, 92 
Cal.App.2d 448,453 [207 P.2d 647].) In Bank of America v. 
Button, 23 Cal.App.2d 651 [74 P.2d 81], it was said (p. 653) : 
"It is the general rule that courts will not take judicial notice 
of other actions even though pending in the same court. 
(Estate of Fulton, 8 Cal.App.2d 423 [48 P.2d 120]; Bro1lJn v. 
Brown, 83 Cal.App. 74 [256 P. 595]; Ralphs v. Hensler, 97 
Cal. 296 [32 P. 243] .) This rule has been made subject to ex-
ception, in the discretion of the court. (Sewell v. Johnson, 165 
Cal. 762 [134 P. 704, Ann.Cas. 1915B 645]; City of Los An-
geles v. Abbott, 217 Cal. 184 [17 P.2d 993] .) The exception is 
only invoked in unusual cases where unreasonable hardship 
would otherwise result. This does not appear to us to be such 
a case." (See also 10 Cal.Jur., §52; 5 Cal.Jur.Supp., §52.) 
In Johnston v. Ota, 43 Cal.App.2d 94, 97 [110 P.2d 507], the 
court stated the general rule and said: ''The only exception 
to the rule is where unreasonable hardship would result. 
(Bank of America v. Button, supra.) Although the judgment 
pleaded was an adjudication of the matter at bar and may have 
been rendered by the same court upon the same cause of action, 
and although such judgment and its supporting papers may be 
on file in the same court still the party pleading such prior 
adjudication carried the burden of establishing his plea which 
can be done only by actual proof of its records. (Glaze v. 
Bogle, supra [105 Ga. 295 (31 S.E. 169)].) 
''It must appear either upon the face of the record or be 
shown by extrinsic evidence that the precise issue raised in the 
second action was determined in the former suit. • • • 
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''There was no circumstance in the instant case that would 
have justified the court's taking judicial notice of the judg-
ment pleaded or of the pleadings which preceded it. . . . '' 
(Emphasis added.) 
If the court is now going to take a different position it should 
overrule those cases. However, it will also have to overrule 
the legislative declaration in section 1962, subdivision 6, of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
There is an additional reason why the demurrer should not 
have been sustained and the prior judgment considered. 
Plaintiff's action was in part for declaratory relief and he 
stated a controversy between himself and defendants thus pre-
senting a case for such relief. ''Thus, it has been pointed out 
that it is rare that a demurrer is an appropriate pleading for 
the defendant to file in an action for declaratory relief, it 
being more appropriate for the defendant to admit the exist-
ence of the controversy, and if the defendant feels that the 
plaintiff has not alleged the facts giving rise to the controversy 
fully and accurately, or that the contentions between the 
parties are not properly stated, he should plead such facts and 
contentions affirmatively as he understands them to be, and 
seek explicit judicial confirmation of his contentions." (15 
Cal.Jur.2d, Declaratory Relief, § 36; see Maguire v. Hibernia 
Sav. & Loan Soc., 23 Cal.2d 719 [146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 
1062] ; Anderson v. Stansbury, 38 Cal.2d 707 [242 P.2d 305]) 
and that rule is particularly applicable to the interpretation 
of a former judgment (Lord v. Garland, 27 Cal.2d 840 [168 
P.2d 5]). 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
18, 1956. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
